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Abstract
The analysis uses the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study to explore migration
trends from 2001 to 2015. Its contributions are to extend this analysis to the period
after the 2011 Census, to use administrative data to measure migration not as a tran-
sition between places but as (potentially) multiple events over the full 2001–2015
period over different distance bands, to add to the UK evidence base on internal
migration trends, and to show how long-term trends appear to override economic
cyclical effects. The results show that internal migration rates over all distance bands
fell from 2001 onward, continuing a decline in migration between Super Output
Areas recorded since 1981, the first date for which there are data. This indicates that
Northern Ireland, despite its unique political and social history, has not been immune
to the long-term migration decline observed elsewhere in Great Britain and other
countries such as the United States. The only caveat to this is that when moves from
Northern Ireland to other places are included in the long-distance band of 50 km or
more then long-distance migration returns to near its 2001–2003 level by 2013. The
analysis also shows that the same personal characteristics as elsewhere are related to
different frequencies and distances of moving.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
There is growing empirical evidence that internal migration rates have
been falling in many high-income countries in different world areas
(Champion, Cooke, & Shuttleworth, 2018). This decline has also been
documented in England and Wales (Shuttleworth, Cooke, &
Champion, 2018) and Scotland (McCollum, Ernsten, Feng, &
Everington, 2020. It has also proved possible to take a UK-wide over-
view using aggregate data (Lomax & Stillwell, 2018), but so far there
has been no analysis specifically on Northern Ireland (NI) using micro-
data that complements the previous work using the Scottish Longitu-
dinal Study and the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study
just noted. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by describing and
analysing internal migration trends in NI, considering the Northern
Irish experience in the context of falling internal migration in many
countries, and to explore how far post-2001 annual migration levels
have continued to fall and whether the 2008 Great Recession has
reinforced this trend. For this, the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study
(NILS) is used. As a data resource that links census and administrative
data, it has the merits of permitting individual-level analysis of migra-
tory behaviour and migration trends.
Besides extending the UK evidence base, NI is of interest for
other reasons. It is unique in many respects given its history of civil
and residential conflict from 1969 in The Troubles and its diverging
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trajectory within an increasingly devolved United Kingdom, which has
seen the decentralisation of some powers. However, at the same time,
it shares many features in common with other advanced economies
such as counterurbanisation, deindustrialisation, occupational shifts,
ageing, and growing levels of education, all of which influence migra-
tion rates (Green, 2018) over longer-term periods of 30 or 40 years.
This combination of uniqueness and shared common factors makes NI
an interesting case study to examine how general the decline in inter-
nal migration might be. There is also considerable interest in under-
standing how mobile the country's population is against the
background of changing levels of residential segregation and in meet-
ing the aspirations for a society that is more mixed in religious as well
as on other social and economic dimensions than it is currently
(Northern Ireland Executive, 2013).
The paper builds on previous work on migration rates in NI, which
examined trends in people's propensity to move between decennial
censuses over the period 1981–2011 (Campbell, 2018). It traces
migration events taking place between April 2001 and October 2015,
using administrative data from the healthcare system that provides
details of people's addresses at six-monthly intervals, which are linked
to data on people's characteristics drawn from the 2011 Census to
see if the migration decline noted after 1981 continued after 2011
and whether economic and political shocks after 2001 influenced
migration levels. It explores the correlates of moves over different dis-
tance bands and with different frequencies, and finally, it offers a
direct comparison to the Scottish analysis of McCollum et al. (2020),
which employs similar data and methods. Before the results are pres-
ented, they are contextualised by the next sections, which introduce
the NI background, present the expectations from previous literature,
describe the NILS data, and outline the methods used. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of its findings and their implications.
2 | NORTHERN IRELAND: UNIQUE OR
NOT?
As just mentioned, it is tempting to view NI as being unique, at least
in postwar Europe, because of its troubled political history, social divi-
sions, and legacy of religion-based residential segregation (Shirlow &
Murtagh, 2006; Shuttleworth & Lloyd, 2009). As its foundation during
the partition of Ireland was based in large part on demographic
considerations to ensure a Protestant majority, it is no surprise that
population has become a highly political issue whether in terms of
total numbers or geographical distribution (Anderson &
Shuttleworth, 1998). Religion is a marker of British and Irish national
identities in a geographical arena where neither British nor Irish state
building has been wholly complete or successful. Three decades of
civil conflict in the so-called Troubles from 1969 also set NI apart, as
also do its current governmental arrangements based on the assump-
tion of two voting blocks, British Unionists and Irish Nationalists.
This background, including the transition since the 1990s from
explicit violence, cannot fail to have influenced internal migration
rates over the long term, given the role of political violence and
intimidation in forcing people to change address as The Troubles
developed in the early 1970s (Darby & Morris, 1974). It sets the scene
for the decrease in migration observed between 1981 and 2011 pre-
sumably from higher levels of movement in the politically and eco-
nomically turbulent 1970s, which in turn is the context for our post-
2001 analysis. Other available indirect evidence suggests that migra-
tion rates were high in the later 1960s and early 1970s, with substan-
tial local demographic changes occurring as a result (CRC 1971;
Gregory, Cunningham, Ell, Lloyd, & Shuttleworth, 2013). A similar
inference can be made from considering residential segregation rates,
which, for example, increased markedly between 1971 and 1991 as
the two communities drew apart but then remained steady between
1991 and 2001, with some evidence of a fall between 2001 and 2011
(Shuttleworth & Lloyd, 2009, 2013). The apparent fall in migration in
more recent years could be read perhaps as a result of the start of the
Peace Process or as a consequence of the same factors causing the
migration decrease seen in other societies.
On the other hand, whilst there is a credible case to be made that
NI is unique, it should not be pressed too far. NI does not exist in a
bubble—it has also experienced many of the labour market, social and
demographic changes that have been seen elsewhere in the United
Kingdom, and, indeed with variations, in other high-income countries.
It is not the intention to survey these in detail here but it is worth-
while noting that, just as elsewhere, there has been a decline in
manufacturing jobs, growth in service employment, an increase in the
proportion of the population with secondary and higher educational
qualifications, and an increase in the population's average age
(Rowland, 2019; Teague, 1993) all of which are compositional drivers
of internal migration (Green, 2018). To these can be added geographi-
cal shifts in the population, notably a fall in the population of Belfast
and particularly of its urban core (Gregory et al., 2013; Power &
Shuttleworth, 1997), no doubt partly as a result of violence as noted
above but also because of housing clearance/improvement and the
move to suburbs and smaller settlements seen in other national con-
texts (Champion, 1989). In summary, there is enough to set NI apart
as a special case, and thus a good test for the generalisability of the
migration decline, but enough in common with other parts of the
United Kingdom (and other countries too) to make useful analytical
comparisons.
3 | EXPECTATIONS AND EVIDENCE FROM
THE EXISTING LITERATURE
It is unnecessary to review the whole literature on declining rates of
internal migration ab initio as this is done elsewhere (Cooke, 2011;
Champion et al 2018), but it is useful to reflect on the social and
demographic correlates of migration as it is through changes in the
composition of a population in terms of these that a start can be made
on analysing temporal trends in migration rates over the long term.
Green (2018) provides a comprehensive review of population changes
and their expected impacts on aggregate migration levels, with key
features including population ageing, rising educational levels,
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increasing home ownership, rises in the numbers of single and
divorced people, and a variety of changes in the labour market. To
these might be added technical factors, such as internet use, and cul-
tural preferences such as Cooke's (2011) “secular rootedness.” The
longer the analytical time period, the bigger these changes will be and
the greater their effect, although compositional changes should have
some effect over the 14-year period between 2001 and 2015 of the
analysis in the present paper.
As regard ageing, the expected effect would be to decrease
migration rates, everything else being equal, because older people
tend to move home less frequently. Therefore, a growing proportion
of older people will shift the population into less migratory age groups
and will tend to force migration rates down. The growth of owner
occupation and decline in renting in the housing market will also push
migration rates down, because renters tend to be more mobile than
owners but the increase in private renting since 2001 might increase
migration propensities.
The other two changes suggested above would tend to act to
increase migration rates. More educated people tend to move more
over longer distances, and hence, the growth of the share of the pop-
ulation with school and postschool qualifications would be expected
to boost longer-distance migration rates. The same outcome would
also be forecast as a result of changes in relationship status—
increased proportions of single and divorced people, who tend to be
more spatially mobile than married people (Cooke 2008), should
increase overall address changing and longer moves.
Labour market change might also be expected on balance to act
to increase migration rates in the long term and to lead to higher
migration in our analytical period. The number of jobs in NI steadily
increased from 1991 onwards before being checked by the Great
Recession but then resuming growth, and there has been a fall in the
number of unemployed people since 2001 who are often less
mobile—apart from in the immediate aftermath of the recession
(Rowland, 2019). At the same time, there has been a historical sectoral
move away from older manufacturing industries such as shipbuilding
towards service employment, which has been matched by occupa-
tional shifts to service-type jobs. These developments might be
expected to increase migration rates as the share of people with char-
acteristics associated with higher rates of migration has grown into
the 21st century (Green, 2018).
The factors that are less easy to hypothesise about are those spe-
cific to NI. The ending of theTroubles and the transition to peace may
have acted to reduce migration as fewer people were compelled to
move. Moreover, the net fall in Belfast's population, which was mostly
between 1971 and 1991, seems to have ceased in later decades, and
segregation grew from 1971, peaked in 1991, and was thereafter sta-
ble or falling, reinforcing the impression that NI's population was more
dynamic and mobile before the 1990s than since then. On the other
hand, the transition to peace in the 1990s, coupled with growing
affluence, might have served to release pent-up demand for moving
home and thereby increase address changing rates.
Evidence on longer-term trends is available from Campbell (2019)
arising from previous work on the NILS. This showed a progressive fall
in the rate of NI's internal migration since the 1980s. Whereas 42% of
NILS members aged 25–74 in 1981 and who also had a census record
in 1991 had moved between Super Output Areas (SOAs) over the
decade, the proportion of the equivalent population in the intercensal
decade 1991–2011 was just 36% and it fell further to 34% in the
2001–2011 period. There are 890 SOAs in NI with an average popu-
lation of around 2,000 people. It was also found that the majority of
this 8 percentage point decline between the 1980s and the 2000s
was attributable to changes in migration behaviour, with only a very
small proportion (less than one-eighth) being explained by changing
population composition. In this latter regard, it would seem that popu-
lation ageing and changes in housing tenure that tend to pull migra-
tion down (for example, shifts towards older people and away from
renting) have over this longer term tended to offset the effects of the
sorts of changes that would tend to push migration rates upwards
(such as the increase in single and divorced people). Increased higher
educational participation probably had an upwards effect but was not
analysed because of difficulties with the education variables in 1981.
This finding—that migration rates have fallen at least at one spatial
scale (that of the SOA) —meshes well with circumstantial evidence
about what is known about the NI's population from the other per-
spectives noted earlier. For instance, the large increase in residential
segregation between 1971 and 1991 (Shuttleworth & Lloyd, 2009)
implied substantial migration as a contributing factor as did the large
population losses from inner-city Belfast and indeed from the city as
whole (Gregory et al., 2013; Power & Shuttleworth, 1997), whereas
the relative stability in residential segregation in 1991–2001 and small
declines since 2001 suggest less intense population movement.
The analysis builds on this foundation. Firstly, it seeks to evaluate
whether the decline in internal migration noted in NI since the 1980s
continued after 2011. Secondly, it assesses whether major economic
and political shocks to NI since 2001 such as the Great Recession and
the Flags Protest (this, starting in December 2012, centred over the
flying of the Union Flag over Belfast City Hall, led to street protests,
and a worsening of community relations) had any impact on annual
internal migration levels. Thirdly, it considers the individual and geo-
graphical determinants of address changes over different distance
bands and whether migrants who leave NI significantly alter our
understandings. Finally, it adds to the comparative migration literature
through an analysis similar to that in Scotland by McCollum
et al. (2020) thereby also helping to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the UK census longitudinal studies for migration research.
4 | USING THE NILS TO ANALYSE
MIGRATION
NILS is the only source that has sufficient detail to answer the ques-
tions set out in the previous section. This dataset is based on the rou-
tine linkage of records from NI's healthcard register to census and
administrative data such as that from the Valuation and Lands Agency.
The healthcard register is nearly universal and includes anyone regis-
tered with the National Health Service at a doctor's practice. It
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captures address changes, from 2001, as they are reported to health
professionals—it is essential to provide either a new or updated home
address when registering with a doctor, getting treatment, or receiv-
ing a prescription. Moves from NI are captured by deregistrations,
moves to there by new or re-registrations. Some demographic groups
(for example young men) lag in reporting address changes (Barr &
Shuttleworth, 2012) but most update their records after a delay
(Foley et al 2017) and, when assessed, migration statistics drawn from
administrative sources are closely comparable with those from the
census in which they are self-reported (Foley, 2017). This permits
migration to be measured as a series of multiple events for any one
individual, with a maximum of one move for each 6-month period.
Furthermore, since house locations are georeferenced very accurately,
it is possible to calculate the precise distances moved. For the pur-
poses of this paper, the distance variable was categorical since a pre-
cise individual distance of move was judged to be disclosive. These
categories were aggregated to give those used in the paper.
The NILS comprises an approximately 28% sample of the NI's
population (drawn from a random selection of 104 birthdates), which
translates to a sample size of between 450,000 to 500,000 individuals
at any single time point but cumulatively far more if the total is reck-
oned as anyone who has ever been a NILS member. The NILS is linked
to the 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 Censuses and holds vital and
migration events after 2011 used for this particular analysis. A full
range of individual census variables are available for each NILS mem-
ber, but there is also census information available for other household
members. Since the NILS contains individual- and household-level
microdata from multiple censuses and administrative sources, the data
can only be accessed by accredited researchers in a secure and super-
vised data laboratory in the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research
Agency (NISRA).
These detailed data on internal migration are conceptualised in
two ways in this study; as binary (any address change as opposed to
no address change) and then as a multiple category variable (moves of
less than 10 km, moves of 10–50 km, and moves of 50 km or more
[with or without emigration from NI]). NI is relatively small
geographically—some 160 km from east to west—so sample members
who left NI were included as the equivalent of longer-distance moves
as, for instance, those between regions in England and Wales or as
longer moves in Scotland. Around 75% of moves outside NI were to
other parts of the United Kingdom at the start of the period, this pro-
portion falling towards its end but remaining at over 50% and includ-
ing an unknown share of movers within the island of Ireland and who
crossed the border. This variable, along with all address changes, is
our main focus. Apart from one important exception—see below—the
results were the same whether or not moves to locations outside NI
were included in the more than 50-km category.
There are some caveats. To preserve confidentiality, a continuous
distance measure was not provided; instead, category data were
recoded as described above. Administrative datasets are also subject
to cleaning and updating. In this case, 2012 saw many more moves
reported than other years because of a concerted attempt to revise
the healthcard register. This is acknowledged and, in the later
quantitative analysis, dealt with by a year dummy for April and
October 2012. The sample used was for NILS members aged 16–64
in 2011 and possessing a census record in that year, and whose
georeferenced location in 2011 in the healthcard register and census
matched at the time of the census or within 6 months of it. On the
basis of these criteria, there were approximately 252,000 sample
members. Note that this sample would be aged 6–54 in 2001 and
would be 20 to 68 years old at the end of our reference period in
2015.
The selection of independent variables for inclusion in the ana-
lyses was informed by pragmatic considerations of what was available
in the census and also by reference to the literature and past prece-
dent (see Shuttleworth et al 2019; Cooke, 2011). They comprise age,
gender, religion, socio-economic status, economic activity, health,
education, and SOA social deprivation. There is a problem that is com-
mon to all analyses of this kind, which arise from the capture of the
independent variables from a census. Many of the explanatory vari-
ables (e.g., education, health, housing tenure, and economic activity)
naturally vary through time as people fall ill, become healthy, or move
house. However, we only know the status of sample members every
10 years when a census occurs so these have to be treated as time
invariant. Taking the 2001 Census as the source for our explanatory
variables was considered, as was measuring individual transitions
between 2001 and 2011, for example in education. However, with
the analytical period running forward to October 2015, the 2001 Cen-
sus would be very dated as would any 2001–2011 transition, so the
pragmatic choice was made to take the independent variables from
the 2011 Census. These are therefore taken as fixed in 2011 for each
person, so the model results for variables that might be expected to
change over time in unpredictable ways, especially for migrants, like
housing tenure, relationship status, and of course type of residential
area (urban/rural, area deprivation level), must be treated with cau-
tion. Finally, time dummy variables are used to measure the all-
important aspect of temporal variation. For comparability with
McCollum et al. (2020), the same time dummies of 2001–2003 (refer-
ence category), 2004–2006, 2007–2009, 2010–2011, 2012, and
2013–15 are used with the exception of 2012, which was, as noted
above, a year with administrative updates.
5 | RESULTS
The results of the first stage of the analysis is set out in Figure 1 and
Table 1, which show, respectively, the annual rate (aggregated from
the six-monthly data) of address changes by distance band between
2001 and 2015 for all NILS members, and the demographic character-
istics of the analytical sample with selected different migratory pro-
files. On this basis the total address changing rate starts at about 4.2%
for the first half-year period and then fluctuates between 6% and
10% for whole years—remember this may also record two moves by
the same person in a single year—peaking in 2006/2007 at a time
when the NI housing market was buoyant but falling afterwards
despite a small increase in 2011. Barring this peak, the overall trend
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for migration within NI appears stable or perhaps slightly declining but
with the important caveat that, when migrants who leave NI are coun-
ted in the greater than 50-km category, this rate increases towards
the end of the period. However, there are limits to the conclusions
that can be drawn from visual inspection of this figure; aggregate
annual migration rates may alter, for example, because of economic
and political events/shocks or else the continuation of longer-term
trends.
Two important initial points to note, before turning to Table 1,
are that few people have high numbers of multiple address changes;
most people do not move at all or only change address once or
twice (Foley, 2017) and those who do move seldom move over
great distances. Bearing in mind the outcome variable that is the
focus for later quantitative analysis (no moves, moves of less than
10 km, moves of 10 to 50 km, and moves of more than 50 km
excluding or including people who leave NI), it was possible to cre-
ate a typology of migration trajectories when a sample member
changed address. There were a vast range of possible migration
sequences, and it was simply impossible to tabulate them all so
Table 1 shows the sample profile, that of members who did not
move, those who moved more than once over 50 km (including
leaving NI), and those who had two or more moves of less than
10 km. These were chosen on the basis of illustrating differences
between different types of sample members' migratory profiles. The
percentages sum to 100% vertically.
Table 1 shows that there are considerable differences in the demo-
graphic characteristics of the subgroups from the composition of the
whole sample. For age group, nonmovers tend to be concentrated more
in the older groups than the sample, whereas multiple movers—whether
over long or short distances—tend to be younger. This accords well with
what might be expected, and it is also worth noting the high proportion
of long-distance migrants among those aged 16–25 in 2011 perhaps
because of higher-education enrolment. There are interesting differen-
tials by marital status with singles dominating the long-distance category
of 50 km or more and the divorced and separated being
overrepresented in the multiple short-distance move category of 10 km
or less. There are major differences by housing tenure; there are a high
proportion of owner occupiers in the nonmovers group, but renters are
overrepresented in the short-distance category and private renters in
the long-distance group. In terms of religion, the demographic subgroup
that really stands out is the one with no religion—this group forms a
greater proportion of the long- and short-distance categories than pro-
portionally in the sample, which is partly a result of its younger age
structure. With respect to educational attainment, there seem to be few
differences between no movers and the entire sample, but long-distance
movers are more highly educated than the other groups and they also
tend to be healthier. There are some geographical differences by migra-
tion trajectory—those who are frequent short-distance migrants tend to
be concentrated in socially deprived places and towns, whilst long-
distance migrants tended to be disproportionately drawn from the least
deprived quartile of SOAs (in terms of their place of residence in 2011)
as defined by the 2010 Measure Deprivation Measure. Some differ-
ences by NS-SEC are also apparent; professionals and students are con-
centrated tend to move longer distances, those in routine occupations
more over short distances.
There are clear differences in the demographic profile of nonmi-
grants, migrants of different types, and the full NILS analytical sample.
Looking first at the variables associated with all address changes, these
are investigated via binary logistic regression in Figures 2a (for the
individual-level results) and 2b (for the household and geographical
results), which graph the results as odds ratios relative to reference cate-
gories. In this, sample members who leave NI are included within the out-
comes variable along with those who migrate just within NI so it is all
address changes that are the focus—although the proportions who emi-
grate are very small. Since time is the central focus of the paper, the anal-
ysis includes temporal dummies. The reference category is 2001–2003,
with the other categories being 2004–2006, 2007–2009, 2010–2011,
2012, and 2013–2015. These categories were chosen to be comparable
with those used in Scotland by McCollum et al. (2020) with the excep-
tion of the separate dummy for 2012. As mentioned earlier, the purpose
F IGURE 1 Annual migration rates,
2001–2015 (percentages), for the Northern
Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS) sample aged
16–64 in 2011, by distance band. Source: NILS,
own calculations
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TABLE 1 Profile of analytical sample by selected migratory trajectories 2001–2015
Characteristics All sample No moves
More than one move
>50 km and emigration Two or more moves <10 km
Gender
Male 46.56 48.97 46.15 40.56
Female 53.44 51.03 53.85 59.44
Age
16–25 19.93 20.17 46.85 21.94
26–35 18.73 9.06 24.99 31.71
36–45 22.14 17.03 13.44 25.26
46–55 22.58 28.65 8.59 14.53
56–64 16.62 25.10 6.14 6.56
Marital status
Single 38.92 36.90 68.99 45.55
Married 49.16 53.14 25.66 37.91
Separated 4.28 3.05 1.52 7.14
Divorced 6.01 4.78 3.20 8.34
Widowed 1.63 2.13 0.59 1.06
Housing tenure
Owner occupied 75.33 86.20 78.26 49.66
Social rented 11.78 9.22 4.69 20.21
Private rented 11.45 3.40 13.99 28.61
Rent free 1.24 1.05 2.06 1.33
Communal establishment 0.20 0.14 0.99 0.18
Religion
Catholic 39.83 41.81 38.68 38.30
Protestant 41.67 43.66 35.35 37.06
Other religion 0.78 0.66 2.20 0.97
No religion 17.71 13.88 23.77 23.67
NS-SEC
Professional 24.49 22.55 28.15 20.98
Intermediate occupation 13.26 12.99 10.22 12.98
Self employed 10.60 11.42 6.20 8.18
Lower supervisory 6.62 6.69 4.21 6.70
Routine occupation 28.16 28.99 16.37 32.36
Not working 7.06 6.40 5.16 10.23
Students 9.82 10.96 29.68 8.56
Education
No qualifications 22.16 25.45 8.93 22.32
Qualifications—Level 1–3 44.25 43.42 44.27 47.31
Qualifications—Level 4+ 25.56 22.51 40.63 22.43
Other qualifications 8.03 8.63 6.17 7.94
Health
Very good/good 80.27 79.04 91.41 78.78
Fair 13.96 15.00 6.44 14.50
Very bad/bad 5.77 5.96 2.15 6.72
Area deprivation—quartile (Q)
MDM Q1 - least deprived 26.02 26.97 31.08 21.28
MDM Q2 25.39 25.83 26.73 22.40
MDM Q3 24.15 24.42 24.29 23.14
MDM Q4—most deprived 24.44 22.79 17.91 33.18
Area type
Rural 33.91 36.51 34.15 22.43
Urban 66.09 63.49 65.85 77.57
Total 251,934 119,005 7,904 41,191
aSource: NILS
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of the 2012 dummy was to take some account of various adjustments
and updates of the healthcard register. The period 2007–2009 overlaps
with the immediate onset of the Great Recession, and 2013–2015 fol-
lows closely on the Flags Protest that began in December 2012 and
which led to heightened political tension and poorer community relations
in 2013 and 2014.
Considering first Figures 2a and 2b—all address changes—there
are large differences as expected by housing tenure with private
renters and communal dwellers much more likely to change their
address than owner occupiers. Communal establishments, in particu-
lar, are associated with mobile groups such as students. There are
large individual-level differences in address changing by age, religion,
and marital status, and some that are statistically significant (5% confi-
dence lines are on the figure) but substantively smaller by education,
NS-SEC, gender, and health. These all make sense in terms of the
migration literature and are of the expected direction. There is good
evidence from the year dummies that there has been a continued
decline in address changes of all sorts as compared with a 2001–2003
base. Differences appear to be minimal between places whether in
terms of social deprivation or urban/rural in all address change rates
after controlling for the other explanatory variables in the model have
been made (urban/rural location is as recorded in the 2011 Census,
social deprivation as measured by the 2010 Measure Deprivation
Measure linked to 2011 SOA of enumeration), but there are clear
temporal effects. This decline is statistically significant and indicates
that controlling for individual situation and location in 2011 there has
been an across-the-board fall in residential mobility in NI that follows
on from the earlier decline noted by Campbell (2018).
Figures 3a and 3b show the results from a multinomial logistic
analysis of moves by distance band (with emigration included in the
>50-km band). Results excluding those who leave NI are presented in
Figures S4a and S4b—they are largely similar with the one significant
F IGURE 2 Binary logistic results for all address changes, 2001–2015. (a) Individual characteristics. Source: Northern Ireland Longitudinal
Study (NILS). (b) Household, geographical, and time correlates. *2005 Multiple Deprivation Measure quartile of Super Output Area. Source: NILS
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exception that in this case moves over 50-km fall through time. Care
is needed in the interpretation of these results as they are compared
against a reference category for the outcome variable—in this case no
move—and also against the reference categories for each of the inde-
pendent variables. This time, the results are presented as relative risk
ratios. As before, there are 5% confidence limits on each bar in the
chart.
Figure 3a demonstrates large differentials by age group with
younger people being far more likely to move over all distance bands
but especially the longest. Divorced and separated NILS members are
also likely to move between 10 and 50 km and less than 10 km than
those who were single, as were those with no or other religion. Those
with Level 4+ qualifications (equivalent to degree level and above)
were more likely to move more than 50 km. There are smaller differ-
ences by NS-SEC and health, which, though statistically significant,
have less substantive importance. This latter analysis shows that there
are differences in the demographic and social characteristics not
only between address changers and nonaddress changers but also
between movers over different distance bands. These indicate that
the experiences and motives of residential migrants are very varied
and that the reasons and motives for why people move differ
between distance bands (Niedomysl, 2011). Multiple short-distance
residential moves of less than 10 km are associated with some
degree of vulnerability, such as poor health and social deprivation
(Tseliou, Maguire, Donnelly, & O'Reilly, 2016), whereas longer dis-
tance residential changes are associated with youth, employment,
and higher education. This is what is expected from the extant liter-
ature; NI is not a place apart.
However, there are two features worthy of more comment. First
is the difference by religion in internal migration behaviour; relative to
Catholics, Protestants are more mobile for the less than 10 km and
10- to 50-km bands, and those with other/no religion are in turn more
mobile than Catholics and Protestants. It is probable that since the
other/no religion groups are relatively small, they might self-select
F IGURE 2 (Continued)
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and be different from the rest of the population in their demographic
and other (unobservable) characteristics. The remaining difference
between Catholics and Protestants is intriguing, since in terms of
characteristics observed in the 2011 Census, these groups are now
very similar to each other in census categories such as housing tenure
and educational attainment, (Rowland, 2019). This suggests that there
are other factors at work—some perhaps social, others perhaps
cultural—making Protestants more mobile than Catholics. Figure 3b
tells us that the residents, in 2011, of the most deprived quartile of
wards were less likely to be long-distance migrants and more likely to
make moves of less than 10 km, as were urban dwellers and social
renters.
As regard the temporal variables, there are statistically significant
decreases across all distance bands until 2011 with a fall in migratory
moves of 50 km or more being especially large in 2010–2011 as seen
in the figures that have been presented. Thereafter, the number of
these movers is not significantly different from the 2001–2003 refer-
ence period although the number of movers who make address
changes of 50 km or less remain well down on this benchmark. This
suggests that a post-2001 residential migration decline occurred
across all distance bands until 2009, with some recovery after that at
the longest (>50 km) distances (when including those leaving NI), but
that continued falls in the numbers of people changing address within
NI in the less than 10 km and 10- to 50-km bands have acted to
F IGURE 3 Multinomial logistic results for address change, 2001–2015, by distance band (including emigrants in >50 km). (a) Individual
characteristics. Source: Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS). (b) Household, geographical, and temporal characteristics. *2005 Multiple
Deprivation Measure quartile of Super Output Area. Source: NILS
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reduce the number of all address changes. It is difficult to explain the
recovery in moves of more than 50 km when including emigrants, but
this might have arisen because of a growth in moves to the rest for
the United Kingdom as the latter moved out of recession. It is inter-
esting to contrast this with the analysis where emigrants—see
Figure S1—are excluded since in this case moves of more than 50 km
remain depressed suggesting a continued decline in internal migration
within NI but not of migrants leaving NI.
6 | DISCUSSION
Looking back to the research themes identified earlier in the paper,
the analysis of the 2001–2015 period suggests that the migration
decline that started in 1981 as noted earlier (see Campbell, 2018)
continued not only through the first decade of the 21st century but
also into its second. According to the results of the binary logistic
analysis of all address changes, the rate fell for each of the time
periods, with NILS sample members being only three quarters as likely
to move in 2013–2015 than in 2001–2003. This is a substantial
decline. Economic uncertainty following the Great Recession of 2008
may be part of the explanation, but the decline in internal migration
predates this and also continued during the subsequent economic
recovery.
These patterns are like those seen in Scotland, using similar data
(see McCollum et al., 2020), but there are differences in what has
been seen in NI by distance band of move. Like Scotland, there were
rate declines across the short- and medium-distance bands and these
would have the greatest numerical importance as most NI residents
move only over short distances. Unlike the Scottish example, the
F IGURE 3 (Continued)
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decline in migration was over the whole 2001–2015 period, and also
unlike Scotland, there are signs that longer distance moves (where
address changes of more than 50 km are merged with moves leaving
NI) recovered to their 2001–2003 levels. There is, however, one
important qualification to this. When moves to places outside NI are
excluded from the more than 50-km category, rates across all distance
bands in 2013–2015 remained beneath their 2001–2003 levels. This
shows that internal migration with origins and destinations within NI
has decreased and people are moving less than in the past. However,
including emigration from NI, long-distance migration grew at the end
of the period, implying that interregional migration within the United
Kingdom and/or international moves have increased. It is unknown
from the NILS where NI residents who leave NI go but some may truly
be emigrants to other countries. The available evidence from NISRA
suggests that at the start of the period, about two thirds of leavers
went to elsewhere in the United Kingdom and about one third to
other countries but by the end of the period the division was nearer
50/50 so interregional migration within the United Kingdom has some
explanatory importance. There is, however, a consistent decline in
migration within NI.
The second research theme was concerned with the identification
of possible effects on the NI migration rate of economic and political
shocks such as the Great Recession of 2007–2008 and the Flags Pro-
test of 2012. The analysis of the NILS data does not reveal anything
associated with these years. There is a general and long-term trend of
decline—excluding migrants who leave NI. This does not necessarily
rule out the sensitivity of migration to political events or economic
cycles in this case, but it does suggest that the size of any such effect
is insufficient to be seen against a general downward trajectory and
presumably deeper and longer acting causes. This accords with recent
findings from the United States (Molloy and Smith 2019), which sug-
gest that economic cyclical or other short-term effects have less influ-
ence on aggregate migration rates—perhaps because of the greater
stickiness of people in place, which means that they become less sen-
sitive to migration drivers than might have been the case in the past.
The third research theme was concerned with the individual and
geographical correlates of moving over different distance bands. In
this regard, the analysis indicates that the demographic factors associ-
ated with internal migration in NI are similar to those noted in the lit-
erature elsewhere (Green, 2018). In itself, this remark is
unexceptional, but it does serve as an antidote to the assumption that
NI is unique and utterly unlike elsewhere. In fact, both in its internal
migration decline and in the drivers of its migration noted above, NI is
just like many other places. The variables with greatest importance on
whether someone moves or not are age and housing tenure. The larg-
est effects, differentiating movers by distance band, in rank order of
size are age, education, housing tenure, and marital status. Of course,
the legacy of conflict and communal division does make NI different
from most other comparable societies, notably in the importance of
religion as a driver of migration and in the political interpretations of
changing population geographies.
In this context, it is worthwhile drawing attention to the result
that other religions and those with no religion are more migratory
than Catholics and Protestants, and after controlling for population
composition and location, that Protestants are significantly more likely
to change address than Catholics. The causes of this require further
investigation as it implies that there are unobserved differences
between religious denominations not accounted for by the models.
These unmeasured differentials might include characteristics such as
place satisfaction, community ties, the legacy of past discrimination,
or something entirely different. Besides raising questions about the
cause of these differences, it would be interesting to know whether
this is a phenomenon specific to NI or something that might be
detected in other parts of the United Kingdom where religion data are
available. The outcomes of changing address (or not) are also worth
exploring against the backdrop of residential segregation.
Shuttleworth et al (2013) concluded that not enough people were
changing address and then moving far enough to reduce (or increase)
segregation between 2001 and 2007. This suggests that the desire to
create more mixed neighbourhoods and to reduce the current geogra-
phy of residential segregation could easily flounder given the continu-
ing decrease in address changing that has been observed in this
analysis which is very likely to mean that more people remain in place.
The analysis also shows that there are no differences in address
changing between SOAs in terms of social deprivation; residents of
the most deprived quartile in 2011 were just as likely to have moved
than those of more affluent SOAs. However, there are some differ-
ences in the distances that are moved by the residents of
neighbourhoods at different rungs on the social deprivation ladder.
Compared with the reference category of the least deprived quartile,
residents of the most deprived SOAs are less likely to make medium-
distance moves and longer-distance moves of 50 km or more (includ-
ing emigration). This suggests that socially deprived people tend to
make shorter-distance moves than others and that perhaps they do
not avail themselves of the full range of regional opportunities. This
indicates some degree of possible entrapment because of a greater
localisation of those from more socially deprived areas unless some
people choose to stay in place. The importance of migration is appar-
ent in Shuttleworth et al (2013) where longer-distance moves are
needed to effect substantial moves up or down the social deprivation
and religion hierarchy of places.
The fourth and final research theme concerned the comparison
between NI and Scotland. There are many similarities in the indi-
vidual factors associated with migration, but there are differences
in the temporal trends observed with NI 's continuous decline
(especially when leavers are excluded). It is worth noting, however,
that the relationship between neighbourhood social deprivation
noted in NI is different from that observed by McCollum
et al. (2020) in Scotland and that there is no clear gradient across
the different distance bands along the quartile ranking and that the
results are sensitive to whether those who leave NI are excluded
or included. The descriptive statistics suggest, however, that fre-
quent short-distance moves of less than 10 km are associated with
personal disadvantage (see Table 1, final column) in health and
housing tenure and being in an urban SOA in 2011 and also in the
most deprived quartile. This implies that multiple short-distance
SHUTTLEWORTH ET AL. 11 of 13
address changes can be a mark of social deprivation and disadvan-
tage, but the frequency of address changing by individuals and
why this might be needs further probing.
7 | CONCLUSION
The paper builds on the contributions of McCollum et al. (2020)
and Campbell (2018) by using administrative data alongside census
data, thereby permitting geographies to be used independent of
official statistical output units, after the 2011 Census. Furthermore,
it allows migration to be described and modelled as a series of
events—the multiple moves that any NILS member might make—
rather than as a single transition between time T and time T + 1. In
this, and its updateability on a six-monthly basis, the NILS data
offer a fresh perspective on migration. This adds to the cross-UK
evidence base, and it also offers an analysis that is similar to that
undertaken by McCollum et al. (2020) using the Scottish Longitudi-
nal Study for Scotland. Its findings, and the wider background back
to 1981, show that internal migration in NI has fallen over the long
term as it has in other countries (Champion et al 2018). In this NI
appears not to be immune from the broader social trends seen
elsewhere. This is also true when the correlates of address chang-
ing and of moving different distances are modelled. The Great
Recession, and indeed the various political events noted after
2001, does not seem to have had any impact on the address
changing or distances moved; the longer-term trend for decreases
in between SOA moves that started in 1981 seem mostly to be
also observable for different distances of move and to continue
after 2011. Either our data or analyses are not sensitive to detect
their effects, or longer term forces have proved more important, or
their impacts have been manifested in other ways, possibly in the
destinations to which migrants move/do not move when they
change address. Despite this insensitivity to political events, religion
remains important as a correlate of migration and, as indicated ear-
lier, this raises questions about why and how this might be. Some
of these questions could be addressed with more years of migra-
tion event data, but others will require primary data collection to
provide answers and yet others from more in-depth analysis of
existing NILS data to deal with issues such as the implications of
individual religion and neighbourhood characteristics for migratory
behaviour.
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NOTES
1https://www.nisra.gov.uk/publications/long-term-international-
migration-statistics-northern-ireland-2018, accessed 15/02/20
2The reduction noted between 2001 and 2011 is likely to be a result of
(a) in situ natural increase/decrease, (b) immigration from outside
Northern Ireland, (c) changes in self-reporting of religion, and (d) greater
integration
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